INTRODUCTION
A concept fundamental to philosophy-virtue 1 -is, with a few notable exceptions, absent from scholarship on constitutional interpretation generally, and originalism in particular. On the one hand, this is surprising because virtue is central to the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, one of the major philosophical traditions. 2 On the other hand, however, this is not surprising given the sociological makeup of the legal academy. 3 The legal academy-again, with notable exceptions 4 -is dominated by scholars at home in the consequentialist and deontological traditions. 5 Originalist scholarship is no exception.
For instance, originalists' normative arguments for originalism come from the deontological and consequentialists traditions. Professor Randy Barnett is representative of the former.
Barnett claims that his "libertarian" 6 originalism is the most normatively attractive form of originalism because it leads to the greatest protection for natural rights. 7 Others, such as Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, have defended originalism based on the good consequences its adoption would produce. 8 4. The most important exception is Professor Lawrence Solum. See, e.g., Farrelly & Solum, supra note 3, at 3-7 (introducing the sole book-length treatment of law and virtue ethics).
5. This is exemplified by the fact that legal scholars routinely utilize concepts associated with the consequentialist and deontological traditions, but rarely utilize concepts from the Aristotelian tradition. See id. at 3-7 (describing the move toward virtue ethics in philosophy and proposing a similar move in law).
6. Furthermore, common perceptions of both virtue ethics and originalism have prevented exploration of how incorporating virtue ethics' insights may make originalism a better theory of constitutional interpretation. The first common perception is that virtue ethics-unlike, for example, deontological ethics-generally does not utilize normative rules and instead focuses on more amorphous concepts, such as character. 10 The second common perception is that originalism operates primarily through legal rules derived from the Constitution's original meaning. 11 An ethical theory that rejects normative rules cannot offer much to a legal theory that deals primarily in legal rules.
This Article fills that void by explaining the many ways in which concepts from virtue ethics are, contrary to popular perception, compatible with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation.
More importantly, I show that originalism is more normatively attractive and descriptively accurate when it takes on board virtue ethics' insights.
Originalism must articulate virtue's role in constitutional interpretation for a number of reasons. First, incorporating the concept of virtue into originalism will give it greater explanatory power. For example, adding the concept of virtue to the mix helps originalism embrace ideals such as judicial craftsmanship. 12 Originalism can, for instance, strive for the judge who is excellent at his craft.
Second, incorporating the concept of virtue into originalism makes originalism more normatively attractive. Originalism has transformed over the past thirty years in response to legal-realist-type criticisms. Most importantly, originalism has come to acknowledge judicial discretion in constitutional adjudication. 13 An originalism that incorporates the lessons of virtue ethics, however, is able to simultaneously preserve originalism as a viable theory of constitutional interpretation while, at the same time, continuing to acknowledge judicial discretion. Virtue ethics enables 13. Originalism's acknowledgment of judicial discretion comes primarily in its embrace of constitutional construction and the preservation of some nonoriginalist precedent. See infra Part I.B.2. originalist judges to effectively interpret and put into practice the Constitution's original meaning despite and, in part, because of this judicial discretion. I touched on aspects of a theory of judicial virtue in my previous writings 14 and, in this Article, I more fully articulate an originalist theory of judicial virtue.
Similarly, incorporating virtue ethics will make originalism better in those contexts where, even though the original meaning provides a determinate answer, a case places significant burdens on the judge's judgment. In this class of cases-neither the easy cases 15 nor those that are underdeterminate 16 -virtue ethics provides the means to explain how judges can best decide.
An originalism that incorporates virtue ethics' insights will give the Constitution's original meaning its due. At the same time, it also gives other factors-such as the practical workability of legal doctrine-their due, all in their proper proportion. For originalists, and for nonoriginalists who value the Constitution's original meaning, 17 this preserves originalism's core insights, while enabling originalism's transformation.
This Article begins by describing originalism and, in particular, the transformation originalism experienced over the past thirty years. Originalism's modern incarnation began in the 1970s and, at that point in its development, originalists primarily argued that originalism was superior to nonoriginalist methodologies because originalism cabined judicial discretion and therefore better respected democracy. Nonoriginalists strongly criticized this claim and, in response, originalists transformed originalism in a number of ways that had, as one effect, the creation of analytical space for judicial discretion within originalism. At this point, however, originalists have yet to explain how acknowledging this judicial discretion has not undermined originalism as a theory of interpretation. Indeed, a recent spate of criticism has utilized this line of attack. 18 Part I also shows the impasse that currently exists regarding the normative foundation for originalism. Originalists have offered a stunning variety of normative defenses of originalism. However, none has its roots in the Aristotelian tradition. This situation parallels that of ethics when 14. Lee J. Strang In Part II, I first describe virtue ethics, and I also explain the relationship between virtue ethics and the broader Aristotelian philosophical tradition, including the concepts of human flourishing and natural law. Then, I recount virtue ethics' recent revival. Lastly, I describe the limited impact virtue ethics has had on legal scholarship generally, and constitutional interpretation in particular.
In Part III, I turn to the heart of the Article: virtue ethics' contributions to originalism. I show that originalism can incorporate virtue ethics' insights even though the two appear incompatible at first blush. Then, I argue that originalism should incorporate virtue ethics' insights, and for two reasons: first, doing so will make originalism more descriptively accurate; and second, originalism will be more normatively attractive once it incorporates virtue ethics' concepts. In particular, I detail four contexts where originalism becomes better: (1) nonoriginalist precedent; (2) constitutional construction; (3) articulating and applying the original meaning; and (4) 
I. ORIGINALISM'S RISE AND TRANSFORMATION

A. Originalism's First Generation
Originalism began as a scholarly movement in the 1970s, the aim of which was to criticize the Warren Court's perceived excesses. 23 Since it was a critical stance, originalism's characteristics met that need. In particular, originalists claimed that originalism was superior to nonoriginalist methodologies because it cabined judicial discretion. 24 Only by tying judges' constitutional interpretations to the meaning intended by the Framers and Ratifiers, argued then-Justice Rehnquist in 1976, would judges remain in their proper-limited-role. 25 The first major originalists scholars were Robert Bork and Raoul Berger. 26 Both lauded originalism for its ability to constrain judges. In his seminal piece, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, Bork-consciously acting in the Warren Court's shadow 27 -argued that the Supreme Court's task was to preserve the "Madisonian" compromise embodied in the Constitution. 28 Originalism's advocates claimed that originalism would cabin judicial discretion by advancing legal norms of relatively concrete breadth. This resulted from the focus, described further below, on the constitutional provisions' framers' concrete intentions. 38 Bork's 1971 discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, for instance, focused on whether the "history . . . reveal [ed] detailed choices" by the Framers. 39 The normative attractiveness of originalism's ability to cabin judicial discretion was tied to a second, related claim: judges limited by originalism respected democracy. 40 In originalism's infancy, its critical stance meant that it focused on the Warren and Burger Courts' most controversial cases, which involved the Court striking down state and federal laws that purportedly infringed on individual rights. 41 35. See id. at 3 ("The Fourteenth Amendment is the case study par excellence of . . . the Supreme Court's 'exercise of the amending power,' its continuing revision of the Constitution under the guise of interpretation."); id. at 458 ("The Court . . . has flouted the will of the framers and substituted an interpretation in flat contradiction of the original design.").
36. See id. at 308 (stating that, if the Warren Court's cases had been "authorized by the Constitution," it would not have been subject to the charge of being "antidemocratic"); id. at 460 (arguing that courts failing to respect their constitutional limits violate the "essence of a democratic society"); see also id. at 22-23 (arguing that "the Justices' substitution of their own meaning for that of the Founders displaces the choices made by the people . . . and it violates the basic principle of government by consent of the governed"). interpretations of more textually rooted criminal procedure rights, such as in Miranda v. Arizona, 45 received significant criticism as well. 46 Originalists contended that the Supreme Court acted undemocratically and hence illegitimately when it overturned acts of the elected branches without a clear warrant in the Constitution's text or history. 47 According to Bork, "Courts must accept any value choice the legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the Constitution." 48 A third characteristic of this early conception of originalism was its focus on original intent. 49 The original intent of a constitutional provision was the meaning that the provision's framers intended it to mean. 50 This facet of originalism was likely unconsciously adopted. It does not appear that early originalists explored the reasons for and implications of adopting an intentionalist focus. 51 For instance, in an early discussion of Brown v. Board of Education, 52 Bork referred to the "framers' intent" and the Fourteenth Amendment's "legislative history" without explaining why that was the authoritative source of constitutional meaning. 53 The tentativeness of this early commitment to intentionalism is shown by the quick move to original meaning originalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, described below.
Busied with defending originalism in a hostile legal academy, originalists focused their attention on the basics: a normative justification for originalism, and how originalism was legitimate in a way the Warren and Burger Courts' approach was not. Originalists did not initially address subtler issues, such as originalism's response to nonoriginalist precedent. Those Nonoriginalists raised a host of criticisms. 55 The most powerful, given originalism's critical stance regarding perceived Warren Court activism, was that originalism did not limit judicial discretion. Nonoriginalists utilized a variety of arguments to support this criticism; I will focus on four.
First, nonoriginalists argued that it was either impossible in principle to ascertain the original intent of a multi-member body, such as the Philadelphia Convention or state ratification conventions; 56 or, if possible, it was practically difficult such that the endeavor would regularly fail. 57 Ronald Dworkin, for instance, echoed others when he claimed that "there is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered, even in principle." 58 Second, nonoriginalists argued that, even when one could reliably ascertain the Constitution's original intent, it frequently "ran out." 59 This occurs, nonoriginalists argued, when societal circumstances have changed to such a degree that the original intent's application is underdeterminate. 60 The original intent also "ran out" when, due to its high level of generality, it did not determine the outcome of concrete cases. 61 These sources of underdeterminacy left judges adrift and their decisions unmoored from the Constitution, thus fatally undermining originalism.
Nonoriginalists further claimed that originalism was fatally flawed because of its commitment to overrule all or almost all nonoriginalist precedent. This was a flaw because it showed that originalism was deeply 55 59. See Brest, supra note 24, at 222 (arguing that the "interpreter's understanding of the original understanding may be so indeterminate as to undermine the rationale for originalism").
60. See id. at 220 (describing the challenge to originalism posed by the requirement to "translate the adopters' intentions into the present").
61. See id. at 216-17 (arguing that, regarding some texts, the Framers intended to delegate interpretative discretion to future interpreters to apply general "concept[s]"). inconsistent with existing legal practice. 62 Originalism's dramatic inconsistency raised the specter of legal instability. 63 Fourth, nonoriginalists charged that originalism was unacceptable because of the bad consequences to which its adoption would lead. 64 Nonoriginalists questioned whether even the most committed originalist would push originalism so far. As Professor Paul Brest commented, originalism "would produce results that even a strict intentionalist would likely reject." 65 2. Originalism's Transformation: The Second Generation
In response to these criticisms, originalists reformulated originalism. 66 For purposes of this Article, the most fundamental way in which originalism changed in response to nonoriginalist criticism was that most originalists acknowledged that judges have discretion in some situations. 67 Professor Keith Whittington summarized this transformation: "By the 1990s, originalists . . . were no longer working so clearly in the shadow of the Legal Realists and the fear of judicial freedom." 68 Relatedly, as originalists explored the process of originalist interpretation and adjudication, they emphasized the crucial role that judges-and especially their capacities such as judgment-play in legal practice.
The originalist concession of judicial interpretative discretion was the result of three moves made by (most) originalists. First, originalists moved away from original intent by adopting an original meaning focus for originalism. 69 Original meaning is the conventional meaning of the Constitution's text at the time of adoption. 70 Although the subjective 62. See id. at 223 ("Strict originalism cannot accommodate most modern decisions under the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, or the virtually plenary scope of congressional power under the commerce clause.").
63. See id. at 231 (arguing that "strict intentionalism produces a highly unstable constitutional order" because the "settled constitutional understanding," embodied in precedent, "is in perpetual jeopardy" of being altered by changes in historical scholarship 71 Original meaning originalism, with its more limited interpretative resources, results in relatively more cases where the Constitution's meaning "runs out." Original meaning originalism opens up the likelihood of underdeterminacy 72 because it limits the data 73 upon which interpretation relies. 74 Original meaning originalism relies on language conventions. Conventions of language usage are positive human artifacts often without hard edges and frequently lacking in richness. 75 Using the classic "no vehicles in the park" example, 76 the language convention for "vehicles" lacks both hard edges (it alone cannot determine whether a motorized scooter counts as a "vehicle") and depth (it alone might preclude an ambulance on a life-saving mission). 77 By contrast, original intent originalism's "data set" is richer. 78 In addition to language conventions, an interpreter has access to information that can provide both more definition to a language convention's boundaries and a greater thickness within those boundaries. Most important, original intent originalism included within its interpretative data the framers' originally expected applications, and their purposes or goals. 79 Returning to the "no vehicles in the park" hypothetical, a judge interpreting the term "vehicles" would know, from the ordinance's legislative history, that the city council that passed the ordinance debated whether the ordinance would apply to scooters, and concluded that it did not. This information would harden "vehicles" scope to exclude scooters. Similarly, a judge would have access to the fact that the city council's purpose in passing the ordinance was to prevent teenagers from driving their cars on the park grounds and terrorizing park patrons. This fact would INTERPRETATION add thickness to the meaning of "vehicles" and exclude ambulances on lifesaving missions from its purview. My claim here-that original meaning originalism results in greater underdeterminacy-is bolstered by original meaning originalists' quick and explicit embrace of the concepts of vagueness and ambiguity to describe the sources of this underdeterminacy. 80 In practice, and for many situations, original meaning and original intent originalism will arrive at the same conclusion. 81 However, there are constitutional terms and phrases for which original intent originalism will provide more evidence from which to draw. Prominent original intent originalist, Professor Richard Kay, has likewise concluded that "public meaning originalism will generate more cases of constitutional indeterminacy than will the originalism of original intentions." 82 Relatedly, the shift to original meaning originalism away from original intent foreclosed access to closure rules. This, in turn, increased the likelihood and frequency of underdeterminacy. Closure rules apply when an interpreter has reached a point when the interpretive data does not provide a right answer. 83 In those situations, the closure rule will instruct the interpreter to choose one of the plausible (but not uniquely correct) candidate interpretations. 84 For example, one of the interpretative rules explicitly embraced by the Constitution's Ninth and Tenth Amendments is that Congress's powers should be narrowly interpreted. 85 Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport's approach, labeled original methods originalism, explicitly embraces closure rules. 89 They argue that, to uncover the Constitution's meaning, 90 originalists must utilize the interpretative rules in place when the Constitution's text was ratified. 91 Original methods originalism's embrace of closure rules is best exemplified by Professors McGinnis and Rappaport's contention that originalism limits or eliminates the need to resort to constitutional construction. 92 Instead of resorting to construction when the Constitution's meaning is vague or ambiguous, they propose that the original interpretative methods prevent underdeterminacy. 93 Of course, there remain many originalists who have continued to advocate for original intent originalism. Most of these originalists too, following the early nonoriginalist criticism described above, have conceded that the Constitution's originally intended meaning "runs out." 94 The second move made by originalists, 95 as a result of originalism's concession of judicial discretion, is their embrace of the concept of constitutional construction. 96 Constitutional construction is the idea that, in at least some cases, the Constitution's original meaning does not determine a case's outcome. 97 The original meaning may limit the range of possible outcomes, but judges are left with discretion. 98 One may ask why, if the move to original meaning caused an increase in originalism's underdeterminacy, originalists made this move. The shift was prompted by nonoriginalist criticism that the original intent did not exist and/or was not practically accessible. Original meaning originalism either defeats or blunts these criticisms. However, it also opens originalism to the charge that it leaves the original meaning underdetermined. In sum, original meaning originalism preserves a determinate core of constitutional meaning while conceding an area of underdeterminacy.
95 meaning when the Constitution's original meaning is underdeterminate, 99 all originalists agree that construction involves the exercise of relatively 100 unbounded choice. 101 The third manifestation of originalism's acknowledgment of discretion is its retention of some nonoriginalist precedent. Originalists have argued that originalism preserves a place for some nonoriginalist precedent. 102 This intermediate position-between "get rid of it all" and "keep it all" 103 -required originalists to draw a line between those nonoriginalist precedents a judge should overrule, and those he should retain. For example, I argued elsewhere that a judge should utilize three factors to determine whether to overrule a nonoriginalist precedent. 104 Applying these factors will 99 . Compare WHITTINGTON, supra note 70, at 7, 9, 11 (arguing that construction is a political and hence non-judicial enterprise), with BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 122 ("I do not share Whittington's characterization of the process of construction as 'political.'"). 102. There is a fairly even split among originalists on whether, and to what extent, originalism preserves at least some nonoriginalist precedent. Originalists scholarship that argues in favor of preservation includes Kurt T. Even those originalists who argue for the overruling of all or nearly all nonoriginalist precedent retain a place for judicial discretion. Professor Randy Barnett, for instance, who has concluded that "the doctrine of precedent is inconsistent with originalism," acknowledges space for an originalist judge to retain nonoriginalist precedent to protect the "claims made by particular persons made in reliance on mistaken precedent." 110 Judges following Professor Barnett's prescription will exercise discretion to determine, among other things, whether the reliance was sufficiently directed to the mistaken precedent and whether it was sufficiently weighty.
In addition to acknowledging judicial discretion in the three contexts I identified, originalists also explained that, even in cases where judges do not have discretion, they must still utilize judgment, along with other human capacities. This move by originalists took many forms, but two characteristics in particular are important for my purposes: the process of articulating and applying the Constitution's original meaning, and originalist precedent.
First, originalists have begun to explain in more detail the analytical process judges utilize.
This process has many features including, importantly, the articulation of the Constitution's original meaning and 105. Strang, supra note 14, at 484 ("The originalist theory of precedent I have been discussing provides that judges will often have broad discretion to determine how to react to nonoriginalist constitutional precedent.").
106 Today's transformed originalism has opened a space for judicial discretion and a place for the exercise of judicial judgment. Originalism today explicitly acknowledges judicial discretion in the contexts of constitutional construction and nonoriginalist precedent.
Further, originalism has also embraced the fact that judges exercise judgment, constrained though it may be, and other human capacities in the contexts of originalist precedent and in the paradigmatic work of articulating and applying the Constitution's original meaning.
C. Impasse in Normative Justifications for Originalism
Originalists have offered a stunning variety of normative justifications for originalism. 113 However, no one has yet offered a normative foundation in virtue ethics. Instead, two camps of originalists state claims that are premised on conflicting philosophical traditions. One group grounds originalism in the deontological tradition, 114 and the other utilizes a consequentialist foundation. 115 While the respective camps have presented powerful and nuanced statements for their positions, the ultimate incompatibility of the camps' respective philosophical commitments has impeded consensus.
Professor Barnett, for example, acknowledged that his natural rightsbased justification for originalism may not persuade those who either do not believe that natural rights exist or do not believe they play the significant role that he attributes to them. 116 119 There, Anscombe argued that ethics had been locked in an evermore-intricate, though still interminable, debate between consequentialists and deontologists. 120 She suggested that a return to virtue ethics might redirect the debate and possibly even overcome the impasse. 121 This Article takes the first step toward making a similar move in the context of constitutional interpretation. By explaining how one of the major theories of constitutional interpretation is improved when informed by virtue ethics, I set the stage for a later piece that will explicitly ground originalism in virtue ethics and the related concept of human flourishing.
D. Conclusion
My goal thus far has been to describe originalism's rise, the criticism to which it has been subject, and originalism's transformation in response to that criticism. The key point of this transformation is that most conceptions of originalism today acknowledge that judicial discretion is an indelible part of judging. Relatedly, as originalists explored originalism's contours, the transformed originalism has acknowledged the sometimes great burdens on judges' judgment and other capacities.
At this point, however, no originalists have explained how these modifications-judicial discretion and burdens on judges' capacities-do not undermine originalism's core insights. Why does significant discretion not undermine originalism's source thesis? 122 And, why do the burdens placed on judges' judgment and capacities not undercut originalism's contribution thesis? 123 In Part III, I show that virtue ethics provides answers to these questions. Virtue ethics has the conceptual "tool kit" to explain how the transformed originalism maintains its core commitments. 137 In the past thirty years, a more broad-based natural law revival has occurred. The commonly cited 138 initiation of today's revival is the publication of John Finnis's Natural Law and Natural Rights in 1980. 139 Contemporaneous with this natural law revival has been the modern revival of interest in virtue ethics, which I discuss below. 140 
B. Relationship Between the Broader Aristotelian Tradition and Virtue Ethics
The Aristotelian tradition has many facets. It makes robust theoretical and practical claims. 141 In this Article, I focus on one concept at home in the tradition: virtue. 142 Philosophy is traditionally divided into theoretical (also known as speculative) 143 subject of being. 146 Practical philosophy's goal is guiding human action, such as in ethics, the subject matter of which includes the licitness of human actions. 147 Virtue ethics falls into the category of practical philosophy. 148 In the Aristotelian philosophical tradition as, for example, in the deontological tradition, there are significant relationships between theoretical and practical propositions. One instance of this is the relationship between the metaphysical understanding of human beings as having a form (essence, or soul), and the practical proposition that human acts are good when they conform to the type of being humans are 149 : rational animals. 150 This Article, by focusing on the practical philosophical concept of virtue, puts to one side most concepts from theoretical philosophy, and much of practical philosophy as well.
C. Virtue Ethics, Natural Law, and the Return to Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is one of the three prominent ethical traditions in the West. 151 Its most widespread form is Aristotelian. 152 The two other competing ethical traditions are deontology and consequentialism. 153 Virtue is a habit 159 -an entrenched disposition of character 160 -to perform a human function well. For example, the virtue of fortitude enables one to ascertain what courage requires in concrete situations and to-willingly-act accordingly. 161 A person who possesses fortitude will know what courage requires in particular situations, have the intellectual disposition to act courageously when called to do so, be emotionally disposed to act courageously, and will reliably act courageously. 162 "The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good; a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent, or admirable person who acts and reacts well, rightly, as she should-she gets things right." 163 Virtues are conventionally divided into two categories 164 : intellectual virtues and moral virtues. 165 The intellectual virtues perfect our reasoning faculties. Those intellectual virtues located in the speculative intellect are understanding, science, and theoretical wisdom; 166 the intellectual virtues in the practical intellect are practical wisdom or prudence, and art. 167 The moral virtues perfect our appetites and most prominently include justice, temperance, and fortitude. 168 Later, in Part III, I use examples to detail how these various virtues operate in originalist constitutional interpretation. At this point, however, let me briefly describe the foundational set of virtues that operate in the context of judging. Judging, as a general activity-in other words, not confined to constitutional interpretation-requires a number of virtues for its successful execution. 169 described the primary virtues required for judging, 170 and my discussion parallels his excellent scholarship.
The principal judicial virtues include: theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom, justice-as-lawfulness, temperance, 171 and fortitude. Next, I describe each of these virtues in more detail.
A judge is excellent only if he has the theoretical wisdom-the intellectual "firepower," we might say-to perform the relatively abstract legal tasks necessary to judging. Judges must possess this capacity in order to know and understand the law that bears on a given case. In some cases, especially hard cases, 172 this task places tremendous burdens on the judge's faculties and, depending on one's theory of adjudication, judges may have to utilize theoretical wisdom on a regular basis. 173 Theoretical wisdom first enables the judge to master the law's "data": the cases, statutes, regulations, legal principles, and legal practices that are pertinent to the case before the judge. 174 This mastery has two components: the judge's pre-existing knowledge of the law in the judge's jurisdiction, and the knowledge of the law that the judge gathers in the context of a particular case. 175 Building on this knowledge of the legal data, the judge must then uncover the relationship between the pertinent legal materialswhich of the legal data structures the other pieces, and how the data is structured. 176 Theoretical wisdom permits the judge to arrive at the structure of legal norms governing a case. 177 For instance, to understand how the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause governs a particular case, a judge would have to grasp the Clause's original meaning, read and understand originalist precedent applying the Clause, and ascertain any authoritative practices under the Clause. 178 Then, the judge would synthesize this data into a coherent legal structure. Most frequently, this takes the form of the legal rules, standards, or principles 170. Professor Solum has written on this subject in many fora. See supra note 9 (listing several works by Professor Solum); see also tailored to the factual context presented by the case. 179 At each step, without significant intellectual capabilities, the judge will perform poorly. Consequently, judges need theoretical wisdom to perform these tasks well.
Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that enables its possessor to perform two tasks well: first, identify those goods that are valuable and therefore worth pursuing; and second, perceive the means most conducive to pursuing those identified goods. 180 Practical wisdom, in the context of judging, is primarily concerned with the second task. 181 Practical wisdom provides the capacity to articulate legal doctrine that mediates legal meaning and the facts presented in cases. 182 Using the Commerce Clause as an example, once a judge has mastered the Clause's operative legal meaning, the judge must still apply that meaning in a case. In doing so, the judge will articulate legal doctrines that connect the meaning to the facts. In the Commerce Clause context, the preNew Deal Supreme Court created a series of doctrines, such as the original packages doctrine 183 and the instrumentalities of commerce doctrine, 184 among others, 185 to do just that. These legal doctrines bridged the 179. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (" [T] he Public Use Clause is most naturally read to authorize takings for public use only if the government or the public actually uses the taken property."); see also Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 ("[T]he transfer of condemned property to a private entity, seen through the eyes of an individual sophisticated in the law at the time of ratification of our 1963 Constitution, would be appropriate in one of three contexts: (1) where public necessity of the extreme sort requires collective action; (2) where the property remains subject to public oversight after transfer to a private entity; and (3) where the property is selected because of facts of independent public significance, rather than the interests of the private entity to which the property is eventually transferred." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
180. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I-II, Q. 57, art. 5; Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, supra note 9, at 192.
181. Practical wisdom in the context of judging is primarily concerned with the second task because the judge's ends are, in the focal case of judging, set for the judge by the pertinent law. As I describe below, however, practical wisdom, in situations when judges exercise discretion, also plays the first role of identifying goods worth pursuing. This occurs, for instance, in the contexts of nonoriginalist precedent and constitutional construction discussed in Part III.C.3, infra.
182. See Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 767-71 (1989) (describing how legal doctrine impacts citizens' practical deliberations); see also Strang, supra note 14, at 486 (describing the relatively free-ranging role practical wisdom will play in the context of nonoriginalist precedent).
183. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441-42 (1827) ("It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution.").
184. analytical space between the Clause's original meaning and the recurring factual situations presented by the cases in which the Court articulated those doctrines. 186 Justice-as-lawfulness is the virtue of giving one's society's laws their due. 187 Justice-as-lawfulness is, in many ways, the excellence that defines a good judge qua judge. 188 Saint Thomas Aquinas recognized this when he described the etymology of "judge." 189 Without the virtue of justice, a judge's incredible intellect, stout courage, and measured temperament would only make the judge worse. 190 A just judge is one who exercises judgment 191 "according to the written law." 192 The judge who possesses the virtue of justice-as-lawfulness has the "habit . . . [of] render[ing] to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will." 193 Saint Thomas's linking of justice-as-lawfulness to a society's positive law flows from the essential role positive law plays in securing a society's common good. 194 In this, St. Thomas followed Aristotle. 195 The virtue of justice-as-lawfulness has the most "bite" when a judge faces a law that the judge does not think-at least in that instanceadvances the common good. 196 faithfulness to the Constitution-its refusal to improperly expand the Due Process Clause's scope 199 -exemplified justice-as-lawfulness. 200 Temperance and fortitude describe two facets of judicial character that a judge must possess to rule according to the law. 201 A temperate judge will hold in check his sensual appetites. 202 A temperate judge will be resistant to the allure of, for instance, the "good life" that a bribe could buy. 203 Courage is the firmness of mind that enables one to react appropriately to danger, 204 and a courageous judge will rule according to the law even in the face of potential harm to his reputation, career, or even family and life. 205 2. Virtue, Human Flourishing, and the Natural Law Important to fully understanding the concept of virtue in the Aristotelian tradition is a related concept: human flourishing. 206 Virtue ethics is teleological because the goal towards which the virtues enable their possessor to move is human flourishing. 207 Virtue is both constitutive of human flourishing and instrumental to securing it.
Human flourishing is the state of being most fully human which, in the Aristotelian tradition, means acting rationally excellently. 208 Humans are distinct from other animals by having the capacity to reason. 209 As a result, a human will be most fully human when he exercises his reason-both theoretical and practical-excellently. 210 A person's excellent utilization of his intellectual faculties is acting virtuously. 211 Therefore, human flourishing is partially constituted by virtue.
Virtue also equips humans to achieve human flourishing. 212 The virtues are those habits of character that perfect the portion of their possessor to which they obtain. 213 For example, a human does not flourish if he is not temperate. A person who characteristically eats excessively has the vice of intemperance. 214 That person has difficulty controlling his pursuit of physical goods, like food and drink. 215 The desire for food controls the person so that the person acts, not in accord with his practical reason, but instead by dictate of his passion. This person, because of his lack of virtue, is prevented from flourishing. To flourish, the intemperate person must acquire the means to do so-a temperate disposition.
Virtue ethics is distinct from, but related to, natural law. Saint Thomas Aquinas described the relationship between virtue and natural law as two complementary mechanisms that direct humans toward human flourishing. 216 Virtues are internal guides to flourishing, while natural law provides external guidance. 217 Natural law is the body of norms that identifies which actions are, and which are not, conducive to human flourishing. 218 Natural law norms are natural because they are tied to human nature: they identify which actions are right and wrong by reference to a being with human characteristics. 219 Natural law precepts are tied to human nature via the goods that natural law norms direct humans to instantiate. 220 those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason."); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 34 ("The basic forms of good grasped by practical understanding are what is good for human beings with the nature they have.").
220. The New Natural Law scholars, including, most prominently, Germain Grisez and John Finnis, have focused their arguments on describing the basic human goods that form the foundation for their conception of natural law. See 1 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE humans is both a rational and animal nature. 221 For instance, the first principles of practical reason identified by St. Thomas include the directions to act practically reasonably, and to preserve oneself. 222 The virtues work hand-in-hand with natural law directives to facilitate pursuit of human flourishing. Most important, the virtue of practical wisdom imparts the capacity to correctly identify the principles of natural law via identification of the goods towards which natural law directs human actions. 223 Practical wisdom also facilitates the choice of the best means to secure a basic human good. 224 The moral virtues ensure that one's appetites for goods are properly ordered by one's reason. 225 This ensures that one's vision of what the natural law requires is not blurred, and that one's passions do not overawe one's (correct) judgment about what the natural law requires one to do. 226 In sum, both virtue and natural law are tools that facilitate one's pursuit of happiness.
This Article explains how originalism and the judicial virtues have an analogous relationship to natural law and virtue. The Constitution's original meaning plays a role parallel to natural law because it contains the external positive 227 norms that direct judges toward our society's common good. The judicial virtues, like virtue more generally, are the internal habits of character that enable judges to know and faithfully apply the original meaning. Both the original meaning and judicial virtues aim to secure the common good of society; both natural law and virtue aim toward human flourishing.
Return to Virtue Ethics
The modern growth of interest in virtue ethics paralleled (and partially coincided with) that of natural law which, as I mentioned above, experienced a revival beginning with John Finnis's celebrated Natural Law 224. See FINNIS, supra note 139, at 88 (describing this facet of practical reason). 225. See ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I-II, Q. 94, art. 4 (describing how one's ability to know and abide by the natural law may be challenged "both as to rectitude and as to knowledge"); see also FINNIS, supra note 139, at 88 (describing how practical reason can help "to bring one's emotions and dispositions into the harmony of an inner peace of mind").
226. The most famous instance of a person's disordered appetite preventing that person from pursuing a known principle of natural law was St. Augustine's theft of pears. See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CONFESSIONS, bk. II, chs. 4-8 (R.S. Pine-Coffin trans., 1961). In this, St. Augustine recounts how, as a youth, he stole pears from a neighbor's tree despite the fact that he was not hungry and that his parents' pear tree produced better fruit. Id. St. Augustine used this episode to exemplify the power of a disordered will-one not tamed by the moral virtues-and how it could push one to perform an act that one knows is wicked. See id.
227. Here, I utilize the understanding of natural law as posited by God. 236 The other distinct set of scholars works within the Thomistic tradition. 237 These various schools of virtue ethics have much in common. In particular, and for purposes of this Article, they overlap significantly in their understanding of what counts as a virtue and the primary virtues. 232. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that virtue ethics "has acquired full status, recognized as a rival to deontological and utilitarian approaches").
233. For a history of Thomism, see ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P., A SHORT HISTORY OF THOMISM (2005). For a history of early to mid-twentieth century Neo-Thomism, see MCCOOL, supra note 134, and MCCOOL, supra note 135.
234. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 3 ("The modern philosophers whom we think of as having put virtue ethics on the map . . . had all absorbed Plato and Aristotle, and in some cases also Aquinas.") (emphasis added).
235. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 3; see also FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS, supra note 231, at 53, 72 (repeatedly citing Aristotle, but referencing St. Thomas three times). Though Foot passed away in late 2010, her work continues to have significant influence.
236. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 8 ("The particular version of virtue ethics I detail and discuss . . . is of a more general kind known as 'neo-Aristotelian.'").
237. See, e.g., CESSARIO, supra note 140, at xvii (stating that his work is deeply indebted to St. 238. The most important distinction between them is that the Neo-Aristotelian virtue theorists focus on virtue ethics derived from human nature understood in contemporary biological terms, while the Thomists frequently present arguments grounded in a metaphysical teleology. Alasdair MacIntyre straddles both schools, especially in his Dependent Rational Animals, where MacIntyre changes the course of his scholarship and embraces the proposition that virtues are based on the "form of life . . . possible for beings who are biologically constituted as we are." MACINTYRE, supra note 209, at x; see also id. at xi (describing his deep debt to St. Thomas's thought). [Vol. 80
D. Virtue Ethics' Limited Impact on Legal Scholarship
Despite flourishing in philosophical discourse, virtue ethics has only barely begun to penetrate legal scholarship. Professor Lawrence Solum has most prominently brought virtue ethics' lessons to bear on legal issues. Solum has written a series of articles, and co-edited a book, focusing on the intersection of law and virtue ethics. 239 A handful of scholars in specific fields of law have similarly begun applying virtue ethics' insights to particular areas of law. 240 There is, as of yet, no work describing the role that virtue may and should play in originalism. This Article partially fills that gap by explaining the multifarious ways in which virtue is essential to a fully developed theory of originalism.
III. ORIGINALISM IS BETTER BECAUSE IT HAS A HOME FOR VIRTUE
In this Part, I locate the important points in the process of originalist constitutional interpretation where virtue can and should play a role. What I describe is a human practice that requires participants with particular qualities if the practice is to flourish.
I begin by noting the common perception that originalism and virtue ethics are incompatible. In response, I argue that originalism can incorporate virtue ethics' insights. Then, and most importantly, I show that originalism should incorporate virtue ethics' insights because doing so will make originalism more descriptively accurate and normatively attractive.
A. Originalism Is Not Immune to Virtue
Originalism can learn from virtue ethics. There is nothing inherent in originalism-its core claims, its foundational premises, or its practical implementation-that precludes it from incorporating virtue ethics' insights. For example, originalism's core claims are described by the fixation and contribution theses. 241 The fixation thesis is that the Constitution's meaning was fixed when it was ratified. 242 This is the Constitution's original meaning. The contribution thesis is that the Constitution's original meaning contributes to the content of constitutional law. 243 Virtue ethics' claims have little, if anything, to say regarding these theses because they address different subjects. Virtue ethics addresses human character and acts, while the fixation and contribution theses address the criteria for the truth of claims regarding constitutional meaning (within originalism). For example, fortitude, in the context of judging, bears on whether or not a judge has the courage to articulate the Constitution's original meaning, not whether or to what extent the Constitution's meaning was fixed at the point of ratification. 244 Similarly, originalism's foundational premises are consistent with virtue ethics. For instance, originalism is premised on the proposition that the Constitution's original meaning is recoverable. 245 Virtue ethics has nothing to say directly to this originalist premise. Instead, virtue ethics can accept the premise and help describe how an interpreter can fulfill that premise.
Lastly, originalism's practical implementation via constitutional precedent, 246 among other mechanisms, 247 also poses no tension with virtue ethics. Indeed, the implementation of the Constitution's original meaning emphasizes that originalism is built on human practices, thereby giving originalism a porosity that enables it to absorb virtue ethics' concepts.
Originalism's consistency with virtue ethics is true for those versions of originalism that do not ground themselves in the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, as well as those that do. For example, Professor Randy Barnett has argued that originalism is the correct interpretative methodology because it leads to a government that gives adequate assurances of natural rights protection. 248 Barnett's normative justification for originalism sounds in the deontological philosophical tradition. 249 That tradition does not exclude the insights of virtue ethics, and the numerous writers in that tradition that have explicitly incorporated virtue ethics evidence this. 250 242. See Solum, supra note 122, at 944, 954. 243. See id. Constitutional law is the label for the rules of law and legal doctrines articulated in Supreme Court constitutional precedent.
244. The virtue of justice-as-lawfulness, which requires a judge to abide by the laws of the judge's society, does not conflict with the fixation and contribution theses because the virtue does not identify what the law is to which the judge owes allegiance, while that identifying function is the theses' purpose. Originalists who are working outside of the Aristotelian tradition can incorporate the concept of virtue because every conception of originalism recognizes that humans play important roles in the practice of constitutional interpretation. The most central such actor is the judge. Judges and other participants in our interpretative practice can perform their roles well or poorly. Virtue helps explain how and why that is the case. It describes (part of) what makes, for instance, a good judge good, and a bad citizen bad.
Of course, versions of originalism, such as mine, that are explicitly grounded on the tenets of the Aristotelian tradition, provide a ready-made home for virtue ethics. In my previous writings, I argued that originalism is the correct interpretative methodology because it best enables members of our society to pursue human flourishing. 251 My argument relied on the Aristotelian tradition's core concept of human flourishing. 252 This Article adds a second strand tying originalism to the Aristotelian tradition by showing that virtue, which facilitates human flourishing, also facilitates originalism.
A common reason for the perceived incompatibility of originalism and virtue ethics is that originalism is purportedly a theory of rules, while virtue ethics eschews rules in favor of elastic concepts like character and virtue. Both of these perceptions reflect reality to some degree, but the conclusion that originalism is incompatible with virtue ethics does not.
The perception that originalism is primarily a methodology of rules likely gained currency from Justice Scalia, one of the earliest prominent originalists. 253 In his judicial 254 and scholarly writings, 255 Justice Scalia argued that originalism will regularly lead to rules as the operative legal norms. The best example of this is his article, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. 256 There, Justice Scalia argued that an originalism of rules will better advance the Rule of Law by, for instance, limiting judicial discretion. 257 Nonoriginalists have focused on this claim in their criticism of originalism, 258 and originalists too have criticized the tendency to equate 251. See Strang, supra note 22, at 982-1000. 252. See id. I also previously identified situations where judges must use the judicial virtues to effectively perform their judicial duties. For example, when federal judges must decide whether to overrule a nonoriginalist precedent, I argued that they must utilize the virtues of justice-as-lawfulness and practical wisdom. Strang, supra note 14, at 484-86. Judges must employ those virtues because their decision requires them to apply three factors, id. at 472, a process that is not significantly law-bounded and places great demands on the judges' judgment.
253. Justice Scalia's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986 provided an early and prominent platform for his advocacy of originalism that he utilized in both his opinions and scholarly writings. originalism with legal rules. 259 On the other hand, a frequent criticism lodged against virtue ethics is that its purported lack of normative rules disables it from offering sufficient ethical guidance. 260 Both of these perceptions, though rooted in reality, are not wholly accurate. Originalists have moved away from Justice Scalia's claim that originalism primarily produces legal rules (if originalists ever embraced the proposition, which is not clear to me). 261 Instead, as Professor Keith Whittington has argued, the level of generality of operative legal norms is determined by the Constitution's original meaning itself. 262 On occasion, that meaning will be rule-like, while on other occasions, it will be abstract. 263 Likewise, virtue theorists, while acknowledging the fuzziness of some of virtue ethics' concepts, have argued that virtue ethics also prescribes rules of conduct. For instance, Rosalind Hursthouse has described the numerous "V-rules" that virtue ethics entails. 264 Consequently, both originalism and virtue ethics produce (legal and ethical) rules and more abstract norms. This conclusion, coupled with originalism's new porosity to virtue ethics, discussed above, 265 sets the stage for my argument below, that originalism should incorporate virtue ethics.
B. Virtue's Home in Originalism
In this section, I show some of the many ways in which concepts from virtue ethics contribute to a richer originalism. First, I show that an originalism that takes on virtue ethics' insights is more descriptively accurate. Second, I describe the virtues' roles at key steps in the interpretative process and show how virtue ethics makes originalism more normatively attractive. I end by summarizing virtue ethics' contribution to originalism: it preserves originalism's core insights, while facilitating its transformation.
hospitable to and paint in a better light common practices; (2) originalism will be able to embrace the widespread and attractive conception of judging as a craft; (3) originalism will be able to emphasize the fact that constitutional interpretation is a human practice; and (4) originalism will better fit the Framers' and Ratifiers' plan of constitutional government which embraced their virtue-infused assumptions.
Fit is a powerful argument in law. 266 The more "data" of a legal practice that a purported "interpretation" of that practice can satisfactorily explain, the more powerful the theory. A proffered interpretation of a legal practice that accounts for only twenty percent of the practice's data does not fit and, therefore, cannot be an interpretation of that practice. However, the quantity of data fit by an interpretation is only one axis upon which to evaluate interpretations. Interpretations also vary on the axis of the quality of their fit. For instance, some interpretations are more elegant than others; they may fit the data more cleanly. The result is that one should prefer an interpretation that paints a practice in a better light even if that interpretation fits slightly less of the data than a competing interpretation.
Currently, originalism is in tension with major facets of American constitutional interpretative practice. Most prominently, critics have argued that originalism cannot account for the role nonoriginalist precedent plays in constitutional adjudication. 267 Constitutional adjudication undeniably continues to employ nonoriginalist precedent. This limits originalism's claim to adequately describe our practice of constitutional interpretation.
Virtue ethics helps originalism incorporate the practice of nonoriginalist precedent. 268 It does so by ensuring that judges who face nonoriginalist precedent will still regard themselves as bound by the Constitution's original meaning, and therefore nonoriginalist precedent will not erode the original meaning's pride-of-place. A judge with the virtue of justice-aslawfulness will seek to give the Constitution's original meaning its full due. Therefore, a virtuous judge will refrain from overruling or limiting a nonoriginalist precedent only for good reasons. 269 Accepting the continued viability of some nonoriginalist precedent will not, therefore, undermine originalism, and originalism can more easily fit this facet of our legal practice.
More important, originalism's picture of practices, such as nonoriginalist precedent, will also be more attractive because it will have the tools to explain how to make judges engaging in the practices the best they can be. Judges' decisions on whether and to what extent to overrule or limit a nonoriginalist precedent will frequently be hard. Judges have to evaluate and weigh a number of factors, each of which has a hard-to-quantify 269. See Strang, supra note 14, at 472 (describing the criteria a judge should consider, to refrain from overruling nonoriginalist precedent).
weight. An originalism that incorporates the lessons of virtue ethics can show how judges faced with those difficult choices can make the best determinations, all things considered. For example, a judge with practical wisdom will, by definition, have the best insight into the extent to which overruling a nonoriginalist precedent would harm Rule of Law values.
Relatedly, an originalism that incorporates concepts from virtue ethics will produce the judges most capable of accurately evaluating nonoriginalist precedent because originalism will have the tools to identify and/or educate judges best suited to the practice. For example, originalism will have the resources to suggest that potential judges "acquire judicial intelligence, integrity, and wisdom" from "train[ing] in the law [and] experience [in] legal practice." 270 With its ability to identify, inculcate, and select for virtuous judges, originalism will produce better results.
Second, once originalism has incorporated virtue ethics' insights, it will also fit the widespread judging-as-craft account of judging. 271 The core insight of this account is that judges are participants in a human practice with internal standards, 272 and that, to be excellent in the craft, a judge must master those standards. Hence, some judges, more than others, are excellent writers, construct elegant analyses of the law, powerfully articulate the law's meaning and import, possess a judicial disposition, and so on.
Virtue ethics helps originalism incorporate this judging-as-craft account of judging. Originalism can emphasize, for instance, the theoretical wisdom a judge needs in order to fashion a persuasive presentation of the Constitution's original meaning.
Third, giving virtue a place in originalism emphasizes, in a way that is often missed, the key fact that constitutional interpretation is a human practice. 273 Virtue helps originalism explain that law is a process, with human actors at each critical step in the process. Law begins when an authorized person or group of people identifies a problem they believe is susceptible to legal solution. These legislators craft a law, the goal of which is to re-order society to solve identified problems. The executive branch enforces the law. In some instances, enforcement requires judicial resolution on whether, to what extent, and how the law applies to discrete parties. Lastly, citizens governed by the law internalize the law and act according to its dictates. 272. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 129, at 187-91 (describing his earlier conception of virtues internal to human practices).
273. See Horwitz, supra note 67, at 106-07 (describing a return to the humancenteredness of legal practice).
At each step in the process of law, human actors will perform their roles more or less well depending upon whether they possess the requisite virtues. The virtues I described above are key to describing and evaluating the performance of these human participants. Below, I describe in detail the virtues required for judges to articulate the Constitution's original meaning and apply that meaning in cases.
Fourth, originalism, bolstered by virtue ethics, better fits the historical record surrounding the Framing and Ratification and therefore the Constitution itself. The Framers and Ratifiers believed in virtue ethics and relied on that belief when constructing the Constitution. 274 Historical and legal scholarship, though differing on the degree to which virtue ethics was part of the intellectual climate during the Framing and Ratification, generally agrees with my modest claim that, among other intellectual commitments, the Framers and Ratifiers believed in virtue ethics and relied on that belief when constructing the Constitution. 275 Perhaps the clearest instance of this is James Madison's observation, in Federalist 57, that [t] he aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust. 276 This conception of representation, which was a premise of the Constitution's structure of representation, 277 incorporated virtue ethics. 278 Originalism, once it has embraced virtue ethics, has a greater ability to appreciate this historical fact. Originalism For each of the following facets of originalist constitutional interpretation, I describe how virtue ethics provides the tools originalism needs to make originalism the best it can be. The virtues' roles fall into two categories: first, where judges exercise discretion; and second, where ascertaining and applying the Constitution's determinate original meaning places significant burdens on judges' faculties. The first category occurs primarily in the contexts of nonoriginalist precedent and constitutional construction, while the second takes place in the contexts of originalist precedent and articulating and applying the original meaning.
The key contribution virtue ethics makes in each instance is that the virtues enable judges to give the original meaning its due, while also giving other interpretative factors their due, all in their proper proportion. Virtue ethics facilitates originalism's transformation because the virtues preserve originalism as a viable interpretative methodology by preventing the transformative admission of judicial discretion from cannibalizing the rest of the theory. I explain this further at the end of this Article.
a. Virtue's Role when Judges Exercise Discretion: Nonoriginalist Precedent and Constitutional Construction
In this section, I describe the various ways the judicial virtues operate when judges possess discretion. The two main instances of this are the contexts of nonoriginalist precedent and constitutional construction.
Nonoriginalist precedent is precedent that incorrectly articulated and/or applied the Constitution's original meaning. 280 Large swaths of American constitutional law are populated or, in some cases, dominated by nonoriginalist precedent. 281 Nonoriginalists have argued that originalism is fatally flawed by this fact because: either originalism will eliminate all nonoriginalist precedent, in which case originalism will be too destabilizing to Rule of Law values; or, originalism will overrule some but not all 279. A possible example of this is the issue of nonoriginalist precedent. If the Framers and Ratifiers employed the concept of virtue when drafting and ratifying "judicial Power," then the original meaning of "judicial Power" is more likely to include a place for nonoriginalist precedent, than if they did not assume judges would utilize the judicial virtues. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 276, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing how Article III tenure protection was necessary to induce excellent lawyers to become federal judges because of the "very considerable bulk" of precedent such judges would have to master).
280. In a recent article, I described in detail the standard of "originalism in good faith" to distinguish originalist from nonoriginalist precedent. Strang, supra note 111, at 1739-52.
281. See Strang, supra note 14, at 430-31. nonoriginalist precedent, which will then give judges tremendous discretion and similarly undermine Rule of Law values. 282 Some originalists, including myself, have argued that federal judges are constitutionally required by Article III to give constitutional precedent, including nonoriginalist precedent, significant respect. 283 In particular, a judge must utilize three factors to decide whether to overrule a nonoriginalist precedent: (1) the extent of the precedent's deviation from the Constitution's original meaning; (2) the harm to Rule of Law values caused by overruling the precedent; and (3) the extent to which the precedent creates a just social ordering. 284 However, this opens originalism to the second nonoriginalist criticism: that originalism gives judges too much discretion. Virtue ethics enables originalism to adequately address this critique.
Originalists can argue that a judge with the judicial virtues will appropriately evaluate the three factors and come to the correct conclusion-the conclusion that gives the Constitution's original meaning its due regard while, at the same time, taking into account other important values, such as stability. First, the virtuous judge will possess the virtue of theoretical wisdom, which will enable the judge to accurately ascertain the Constitution's original meaning. For instance, when faced with a case that requires a judge to ascertain the Commerce Clause's meaning, this virtue will permit the judge to perform the necessary research into the historical data. 285 The judge will also review pertinent originalist precedent. 286 Then, the judge will synthesize those legal materials into the authoritative constitutional meaning. At the same time, the judge will ascertain the meaning of the nonoriginalist precedent in question. 287 Second, a judge with the virtue of justice-as-lawfulness has the disposition to give the Constitution's original meaning, and binding originalist precedent, its due regard: to treat it as controlling. This means, among other things, that the virtuous judge will be inclined to overrule nonoriginalist precedent, especially precedent that deviates greatly from the Constitution's original meaning.
For example, Wickard v. Filburn pronounced what has become known as the substantial effects test. 288 Wickard is a nonoriginalist precedent because it incorrectly articulated the Commerce Clause's original meaning. 289 Coming to this conclusion will incline the virtuous judge to overrule Wickard.
Third, the virtuous judge will utilize the virtue of practical wisdom to ascertain the extent of harm to Rule of Law values (if any) that the judge would cause if he overruled a precedent. This will frequently be a difficult task. For instance, in evaluating whether to overrule (or limit) Wickard, the judge faces the daunting challenge of calculating the reliance interests built on Wickard; for instance, in the form of numerous federal statutes premised on the substantial effects test. 290 Additionally, practical wisdom empowers a judge to articulate legal doctrine that will accurately connect the Constitution's meaning to the facts presented by a case. In the context of nonoriginalist precedent, this will frequently be a challenging task if the judge determines not to overrule the precedent but, instead, to limit it. The judge will then have to modify existing (nonoriginalist) doctrine in a way that moves constitutional law toward the original meaning, while at the same time ensuring that the doctrine is as coherent as possible. The challenge to doctrinal coherence is caused by the dichotomous commitments made by the hypothetical doctrine: on the one hand, the nonoriginalist precedent remains viable, pulling the doctrine in one direction; and on the other hand, the original meaning pulls the doctrine in another direction. Practical wisdom gives a judge the ability to make the best of this difficult-though very commonsituation.
This was arguably the situation faced by the Justices inclined to limit Wickard in United States v. Lopez. 291 Wickard's substantial effects test, the majority acknowledged, could justify upholding the challenged law. 292 To preserve-and limit-Wickard, while at the same time moving the Court's Commerce Clause case law toward the original meaning, the majority articulated the commercial/noncommercial distinction as an added limit to Wickard's reach. 293 Fourth, in evaluating whether the nonoriginalist precedent in question creates a just ordering, a judge must utilize the virtue of justice-asfairness. 294 294. In addition to justice-as-lawfulness, described in the text, Aristotle also described a narrower manifestation of justice: justice as equality, or justice-as-fairness. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 187, at 1129b. Justice-as-fairness is giving each individual his due without giving the pertinent legal norm dispositive weight. Scholars often employ the label "general" justice for justice-as-lawfulness, and "particular" justice for justice-as-equality. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 143, AT 130 n.e ("'General' is the more convenient qualifier because Aquinas, following Aristotle, divides justice into 'general' ('legal') and 'particular' (or 'special')."); KRAUT, supra note 187, at 102 n.6 ("Many scholars call justice as lawfulness 'universal' or 'general' justice, and justice as equality 'particular' or 'special' toward overruling the nonoriginalist precedent-because of its illegalitythe virtue of justice-as-fairness enables the judge to determine whether the precedent otherwise-that is, despite its inconsistency with the original meaning-properly orders relations.
Again, taking a constitutional challenge to Wickard as our example, the virtuous judge will decide whether the increased scope to Congress's Commerce Clause authority increases or decreases just relationships. One place where this inquiry has bite is the federal antidiscrimination laws that are premised on Wickard's expansive reading of the Commerce Clause. Would overruling Wickard cause the demise of the Civil Rights Act, which helped eliminate one form of unjust ordering? 295 Each of the decisions made by a judge in the process of evaluating the continued vitality of a nonoriginalist precedent is augmented by a virtue. Having these virtues, by hypothesis, makes it more likely that these decisions are the best they can be. Therefore, although a judge has discretion, that discretion does not undermine the originalist project because the Constitution's original meaning is given pride-of-place, consistent with other values.
Indeed, the virtuous judge's discretion provides the opportunity to arrive at the best (humanly possible) decision, all things considered. The virtuous judge will not be the perfect judge, however, and this is especially true when the burdens on the judge's capacities are at their highest; for instance, in determining harm to Rule of Law values.
Constitutional construction is another part of originalism that explicitly acknowledges judicial discretion. As with nonoriginalist precedent, originalism augmented by virtue ethics can incorporate the concept of construction without undermining originalism. This is because a judge who possesses the judicial virtues will, so far as possible, respect the Constitution's original meaning and, by hypothesis, construct the best constitutional meaning within the original meaning's parameters.
As I described above, 296 constitutional construction occurs when the Constitution's meaning is underdetermined. That is, using his best efforts, a judge is unable to conclude that the Constitution provides one right answer to a legal question. 297 In other words, the Constitution's meaning limits possible answers to a legal question, but it does not designate one answer as uniquely correct. Judges, in the context of constitutional justice."); see also Strang, supra note 14, at 477-78 (describing this concept in greater detail).
295. This determination, in turn, involves a significant number of subsidiary determinations that require practical wisdom for their proper resolution: Are there other plausible constitutional bases for the Act? Do state and local antidiscrimination laws adequately ensure just relationships in the absence of federal law? Are popular mores such that federal antidiscrimination laws are no longer necessary? Are federal antidiscrimination laws themselves sufficiently harmful in their collateral consequences that their elimination is, on balance, good?
296. See supra Part I.B.2. 297. In all situations of which I am aware, the Constitution has some meaning that bears on the point and therefore provides some guidance, so the original meaning is underdetermined and not indeterminate. construction are, therefore, left with a choice. Judges must choose one of the answers that is consistent with, but not determined by, the Constitution.
As with nonoriginalist precedent, the judicial virtues of theoretical wisdom and justice-as-lawfulness will enable the virtuous judge to correctly decide what the original meaning is, allow the judge to recognize that the original meaning does not determine the outcome of the case, and give the judge the disposition to follow, so far as possible, that original meaning. These virtues prevent the judge from seeing underdeterminacy when the original meaning is determinate. This preserves the original meaning's primacy in constitutional interpretation.
Practical wisdom, unlike in the context of nonoriginalist precedent, performs on a significantly more "open field" here. In the nonoriginalist precedent context, the judge's practical wisdom is limited to the task of ascertaining whether and to what extent overruling would harm the Rule of Law. That is frequently a difficult task, though it is focused. By contrast here, within the known original meaning, the judge's task is to play the legislative role of constructing constitutional meaning that will best advance the common good. All of the variables that a legislator would take into account, the judge should also utilize.
By contrast, constitutional interpretation, discussed below, does not place as significant a burden on judges' practical wisdom because the original meaning determines those cases' outcomes.
b. Virtue's Place in Determinate Law: Constitutional Interpretation and Originalist Precedent
In this section, I spell out how virtue ethics makes originalism a better theory even in those many situations where, unlike above, judicial decisions are constrained by the original meaning. The common theme here is that there are hard cases that place significant burdens on judges' faculties, and that to bear those burdens well, judges need the judicial virtues.
The core process of constitutional interpretation includes both articulating the Constitution's meaning and applying that meaning in the context of a case. 298 Constitutional interpretation differs from construction (and nonoriginalist precedent) because, unlike with construction, judges do not have discretion. Consequently, the virtues' roles are different, though still significant.
Constitutional interpretation occurs when the Constitution's determinate meaning is explicated. In originalism, constitutional meaning is the constitutional text's publicly understood meaning when that text was ratified. One identifies the Constitution's original meaning by looking at the text and structure of the Constitution in light of the historical, cultural, religious, and philosophical contexts in which the text was adopted. This is primarily an historical inquiry. 298 . Compare Strang, supra note 111, at 1767-78, with Solum, supra note 101, at 95, 100-08 (describing these two stages in a different manner).
A judge engaged in constitutional interpretation will need the intellectual virtue of theoretical wisdom. The need for theoretical wisdom will vary depending on, among other variables, how patent the text's original meaning is. In some situations, this is a difficult task. A possible example of this is the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Although there are extensive discussions of the Clause in the Reconstruction Congress, the Clause's original meaning is relatively difficult to reconstruct. 299 As with other facets of originalism, judges will also need the moral virtue of justice-as-lawfulness. This ensures that the judges follow the original meaning.
A judge will utilize practical wisdom to bridge the distance between the Constitution's original meaning and the facts of a case. The larger the distance, the greater the burden practical wisdom must carry. For instance, in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court faced the challenge of articulating constitutional doctrine that, faithful to the Commerce Clause's original meaning, specified 300 how that meaning governed a changing economy and society. In particular, the challenge included properly mediating the Clause's application to new or newly common phenomena. The Court met this challenge by articulating a number of constitutional law doctrines.
The original packages doctrine is one such doctrinal move. In a series of cases, beginning in 1827 with Brown v. Maryland, 301 the Supreme Court fashioned the doctrine to mediate two constitutional commitments: (1) Congress's authority over interstate commerce; and (2) the states' reserved police power over in-state commercial transactions. The doctrine's function was to find a doctrinal line that accomplished this purpose and fit the facts of the world.
For example, in Austin v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court decided whether the doctrine applied to cigarettes imported from other states in relatively small packages. 302 To reach its conclusion, the Court reviewed the doctrine's seventy-year history, and how the doctrine advanced its purpose of mediating between the constitutional commitments identified above. 303 In many of the original packages doctrine cases, the Court engaged in similar line drawing. Practical wisdom facilitated this.
Originalist precedent is one-particularly important-facet of constitutional interpretation, where judges do not have discretion. To properly understand, synthesize, follow, and apply originalist precedent, a judge will need theoretical wisdom, justice-as-lawfulness, and practical wisdom.
Using the pre-New Deal Commerce Clause case law as an example, the Supreme Court had crafted a number of interrelated doctrines that formed a complex body of law. These included: the original packages doctrine, 304 mentioned above, the instrumentalities of commerce doctrine, 305 the streams of commerce doctrine, 306 the doctrinal distinction between commerce and manufacturing, 307 and the related doctrinal distinction between direct and indirect effects. 308 These doctrines represented the Court's attempt to follow the twin constitutional commitments to federal commerce power and state police power. 309 To master this intricate body of law, a judge would have needed theoretical wisdom, and to have followed it faithfully would have required justice-as-lawfulness.
Originalism Transformed into a Home for Virtue
Incorporating virtue ethics into originalism makes originalism's transformation possible. Originalists can embrace the discretion wielded by judges as a result of originalism's response to legal-realist-type criticism because virtue ethics provides the tools to show that originalism's core insights remain intact. The Constitution's original meaning retains its privileged position because of justice-as-lawfulness, which inclines judges to follow it, and theoretical wisdom helps judges accurately ascertain the original meaning.
In those situations where judges wield discretion, practical wisdom, and the moral virtues of temperance and fortitude, ensure that judges reach the humanly best result within the scope of the judge's discretion. When judges do not have discretion, the virtues ensure that judges construct the best legal doctrines. , 156 U.S. at 13 ("It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation between them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed, for while the one furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the preservation of the autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of government.").
